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Studies in the economics of crime literature have reached mixed conclusions on the deterrence 
hypothesis. One explanation which has been offered for the failure to find evidence of a deterrent 
effect in the long run is the natural rate of crime. This paper applies the univariate Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) unit root test with one and two structural breaks to crime series for the United 
Kingdom and United States and the panel LM unit root test with and without a structural break to 
crime rates for a panel of G7 countries to examine whether there is a natural rate of crime. Our 
main finding is that when we allow for two structural breaks in the LM unit root test and a structural 
break in the panel data unit root test, there is strong evidence of a natural rate of crime. The policy 
implications of our findings is that governments should focus on altering the economic and social 
structural profile which determines crime in the long run rather than increasing expenditure on law 
enforcement which will at best reduce crime rates in the short run. 
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IS THERE A NATURAL RATE OF CRIME? 
1.   INTRODUCTION  
The economic approach to crime pioneered by Becker (1968) postulates that optimizing individuals 
engage in criminal activities depending upon the expected returns from crime relative to the costs 
including the probability of apprehension, conviction and punishment. Beginning with Ehrlich 
(1973) a large empirical literature has emerged using a ‘supply of offences’ function which sets out 
to test whether an increase in criminal sanctions reduces crime rates. These studies have, at best, 
reached mixed conclusions as to whether there is a deterrent effect. While some studies have 
found that an increase in criminal sanctions reduces crime rates (see e.g. Ehrlich, 1973; Levitt, 
1997; Corman and Mocan, 2000; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004), other studies suggest either a 
weak relationship or no relationship at all between the two variables (see e.g. Myers, 1983; Buck 
et. al, 1983; Cornwall and Trumbull, 1994). Various explanations have been offered as to why an 
increase in criminal sanctions need not deter crime (see e.g. Cameron, 1988, pp. 302-307). Some 
of these explanations focus on measurement problems such as simultaneity between crime and 
criminal sanctions, while others emphasize that the economic approach to crime does not 
necessarily predict that an increase in criminal sanctions will deter potential offenders. One 
economic argument as to why there might be no deterrent effect in the long-run is the concept of a 
natural rate of crime (Buck et al. 1983, 1985; Friedman et al., 1989; Philipson and Posner, 1996). 
 
The notion of the natural rate of crime was introduced into the economics of crime literature by 
Buck et al. (1983, 1985) through drawing an analogy with the natural rate of unemployment. There 
is an extensive empirical literature which has applied unit root testing to examine whether there is a 
natural rate of unemployment.  The contribution of this paper is that we study the natural rate of 
crime as an extension of this approach; specifically, for the first time in the literature, we apply the 
same unit root testing methodology which has been used to examine whether there is a natural 
rate of unemployment to test for the existence of a natural rate of crime. If we are able to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root in the crime rate, this is consistent with the existence of a natural rate 
of crime. This implies that while deterrence activities, such as a police crackdown, can cause 
deviations from the natural rate of crime, in the long-run the crime rate will return to its equilibrium 
level. If, on the other hand, we find that the crime rate is non stationary, this is consistent with the 
crime hysteresis hypothesis which states that cyclical fluctuations have permanent effects on crime 
rates. If the hypothesis of hysteresis in crime rates is correct, this provides an empirical foundation 
for increased government expenditure on police activities to fight crime, particularly in periods of 
high crime.   
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We begin through examining the unit root properties of annual time series data for aggregate total 
crime as well as specific types of crime for the United States for the period 1960 to 2002 and for 
the United Kingdom for the period 1898 to 1999. To accomplish this task, in addition to the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron and DF-Generalized Least Squares (GLS) unit 
root test proposed by Elliot et al. (1996), we employ the Lee and Strazicich (2003a, 2003b) 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test with one and two structural breaks.  The Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) ADF-type endogenous break unit root tests have become 
popular tests among researchers to accommodate structural breaks. A limitation on these ADF-
type endogenous break unit root tests, however, is that the critical values are derived while 
assuming no break(s) under the null. Nunes et al. (1997) show that this assumption leads to size 
distortions in the presence of a unit root with one or two breaks.  As a result, when utilizing ADF-
type endogenous break unit root tests, one might conclude that a time series is trend stationary, 
when in fact it is nonstationary with break(s), meaning that spurious rejections might occur.  In 
contrast to the ADF test, the LM unit root test has the advantage that it is unaffected by breaks 
under the null (see Lee and Strazicich, 2001). 
 
After examining the unit root properties of specific crimes in the United Kingdom and United States 
we proceed to examine the unit root properties of aggregate total crime for a panel of G7 countries 
over the period 1980 to 2002. We applied the LM panel unit root test without a structural break and 
the LM panel unit root test with one structural break developed by Im et al. (2005) to the G7 panel 
as well as smaller panels consisting of G7 civil law countries and G7 common law countries. The 
remainder of the paper is set out as follows.  The next section discusses the natural rate of crime 
concept in more detail. Section 3 sets out the econometric methodology.  The data and empirical 
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains a discussion of the implications of the results 
for the deterrence hypothesis and the final section summarizes the main conclusions.  
 
Briefly foreshadowing our main results, we find that the LM unit root test with one structural break 
suggests that there is a natural rate of crime for assault, violent crime and motor vehicle theft in the 
United States, while the LM unit root test with two structural breaks finds that the total crime rate as 
well as well as five of the seven specific crime series have a natural rate in the United Kingdom. 
The LM panel data unit root test is unable to reject the joint null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
aggregate total crime rate for the G7 panel as well as smaller panels of G7, civil and common law 
countries, but when we allow for a structural break, the LM unit root test rejects the joint null 
hypothesis in each case, suggesting that crime rates in G7 countries are characterized by a natural 
rate.  
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2.   THE NATURAL RATE OF CRIME 
The natural rate of crime as a long-run equilibrium phenomenon as formulated by Buck et al. 
(1983, 1985) and Friedman et al. (1989) has similar theoretical underpinnings to the natural rate of 
unemployment. Friedman et al. (1989) makes the relationship between the two concepts explicit 
through presenting a modified Phillips Curve to illustrate the natural rate of crime which substitutes 
moves of the short-run trade-off curve between crime and police expenditure in response to the 
learning behavior of criminals for moves of the short-run trade off curve between inflation and 
unemployment in response to the adaptive behavior of the public. The notion of a natural rate of 
unemployment is well known (Friedman, 1968). The natural rate of unemployment hypothesis 
states that a long-run equilibrium level of unemployment exists which is the result of given 
structural features of the economy and the frictional effects of workers searching for new positions. 
If there is a natural rate of unemployment, demand management policies which stimulate 
aggregate demand will reduce short-run unemployment at the expense of increasing inflation, but 
have no long-run effect on the natural rate of unemployment. 
 
Buck et al. (1983, 1985) hypothesized that property crimes have similar features to unemployment 
and that while increases in police expenditure deter crime in the short run, crime returns in the long 
run to its natural level. Buck et al. (1983, pp. 479-480) postulate that in the short run the crime level 
is affected by crime prevention policies and community characteristics such as demographic 
composition and income level, while in the long run, the economic and social structural profiles 
which exhibit little variation over time dictate the natural rate level. Their argument is “that police 
activity might deter only marginal crimes at the ‘bottom’ of the crime ordering. Thus the crimes with 
high net returns [are] basically unaffected in the long …. run by conventional police outlays” (Buck 
et al., 1983, p. 473). This conjecture is based on the premise that there is a pool of potential 
criminals who experience decreasing marginal returns to legal activity, for whom the expected 
return to property crime is so high that any feasible increase in police surveillance would not 
reduce the number of crimes in the long run (Buck et al., 1983; Friedman et al., 1989). Possible 
reasons for this outcome is that over time, potential criminals become more sophisticated in their 
assessment of higher levels of police activity and may even research possible targets (Buck et al., 
1983) or that there is a learning-by-doing effect where over time criminals learn by doing how to 
cope with police practices (Friedman et al., 1989). Either way, with the increased professionalism 
of criminal activity, in the long run the marginal benefits of committing property crime are restored, 
resulting in an increase in the crime rate in spite of increased expenditure. 
 
The pool of potential criminals whose marginal benefits of an additional unit of time in legal activity 
are diminishing include the long-term unemployed. While job search is a legitimate activity, 
continued unemployment makes one less employable (Buck et al., 1985). Lippman and McCall   5
(1976) show that ongoing unsuccessful job search results in depreciation of human capital stock 
and a reduced reservation wage. Buck et al. (1985, p. 247) argue that the pool of potential 
criminals also includes unskilled, minimum wage workers with few prospects for advancement, 
who endure reduced job attachment.  Freeman (1996) argues that the deterioration in real wages 
for those on the bottom rungs of the earnings distribution since the mid-1970s and the collapse in 
the job market for less skilled males in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to 
increased crime.  
 
The pool of potential criminals who commit property crime in the long run also includes individuals 
who have a target income such as those with drug or gambling addictions. In the United States a 
high proportion of individuals arrested for non-drug crimes test positive for drug use. In the 1992 
census, between 50 and 80 per cent of those arrested for non-drug offences tested positive for 
drug use (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1993, Table 315 cited in Freeman, 1996, p. 32). In a study of 23 
U.S. cities, up to 83 per cent of males and 80 per cent of females arrested were under the 
influence of at least one illicit drug at the time of arrest, (Jofre-Bonet and Sindelar, 2002). Corman 
and Mocan (2000) reached mixed conclusions about the relationship between drug use and crime 
rates using time series data for New York. They found no significant relationship between drug use 
and assault, murder or motor vehicle theft, but found that drug use has a statistically significant 
effect on burglaries and robberies. There are a number of studies based on interviews with 
convicted criminals which suggest that the need to finance a drug habit is a primary reason for 
committing property crime. In one study Boyum and Kleiman (1995) found that 39 per cent of 
cocaine and crack users claim to have committed crime to finance their drug habits. A survey by 
Petersilia et al. (1978) of incarcerated armed robbers in the United States found that a desire to 
purchase drugs was the most often cited reason for committing crime. Chaiken and Chaiken 
(1982) who interviewed inmates entering prison in California, Michigan and Texas found that the 
robbery rate was generally higher among daily heroin users than less frequent users or non-users. 
 
There is an extensive empirical literature which has utilized unit root testing to examine whether 
there is a natural rate of unemployment. If the null hypothesis of a unit root in the level of 
unemployment is rejected, meaning that the data are stationary, this implies that there is a natural 
rate of unemployment.  If the level of unemployment is characterized as a non-stationary or unit 
root process, there is unemployment hysteresis, meaning that cyclical fluctuations will have 
permanent effects on the level of unemployment. The initial studies on this topic applied 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests to examine whether there is a natural rate of unemployment, 
including Blanchard and Summers (1986) (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States); Brunello (1990) (Japan) and Mitchell (1993) and Roed (1996) (sample of OECD 
countries). More recent studies apply the Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell   6
(1997) unit root tests with one or two structural breaks to test for a natural rate in OECD 
unemployment rates (see e.g. Papell et al., 2000) or various panel data unit root tests. The latter 
have examined unemployment data for panels of states in Australia (Smyth, 2003); states in the 
United States (Song and Wu, 1997), European Union countries (Leon-Ledesma, 2002) and OECD 
countries (Song and Wu, 1998). 
 
Our approach is to build on the logic underpinning this literature to test the natural rate of crime 
hypothesis using the univariate LM unit root test with one and two structural breaks and the panel 
LM unit root test with and without a structural break. By analogy with the unit root literature testing 
for the natural rate of unemployment, if the null hypothesis of a unit root in the crime rate is 
rejected, this is evidence of a natural rate of crime; otherwise the crime hysteresis hypothesis is 
supported.  Buck et al. (1983, p. 473) suggest that the natural rate of crime hypothesis is valid for 
all types of property crime motivated by the profit-maximization attitude of offenders, including 
burglaries, robberies, motor vehicle thefts and larcenies. In addition to testing the natural rate of 
crime hypothesis using data for various property crimes we also examine the natural rate of crime 
hypothesis for various crimes against the person such as assault, rape and murder.  The reason 
we examine crimes against the person in addition to property crime is that while the economic 
model of crime is really a model of property crime, studies using the Ehrlich (1973) ‘supply of 
offences’ approach have also attempted to explain crimes against the person. The rationale for 
applying the economic model to crimes against the person is that these are often extensions of 
property crime – for example assault or even murder is often a by-product of burglaries or 
robberies if the offender is disturbed. There is even some evidence from criminology studies that 
homicide rates are positively correlated with income inequality across U.S. cities (Land et al., 
1990). However, having said this, the economic model has not had much success explaining 
crimes against the person. Even studies which have found a deterrent effect for property crime 
often fail to find a deterrent effect for crimes against the person. This result is often explained in 
terms of the latter being ‘crimes of passion’ (see e.g. Withers, 1984). 
 
While Buck et al. (1983, 1985) focus on the high returns to property crime, the same argument is 
equally applicable for other crimes such as drug dealing. Reuter et al. (1990) surveyed drug 
dealers in Washington DC on their income from dealing and on the basis of their responses, 
estimated that the illegitimate earnings of drug dealers exceeded their legitimate earnings by 
enough to make it financially worth their while to spend one year in jail for every two years they 
sold drugs. Because there is an increasing amount of drug-related violent crime in the United 
States, violent crimes against the person - including murder - become an extension of the 
argument that there is a natural rate of drug crime due to the high returns to dealing. Using data on 
FBI crime rates for 27 metropolitan areas, Grogger and Willis (2000) found that crack cocaine use   7
in the United States had a substantial positive effect on the prevalence of violent crime. Levitt and 
Venkatesh (2000) focus on the rise of gang violence commensurate with the prevalence of crack 
cocaine, discussing how the crack cocaine market proved lucrative for gangs, leading to violence 
as rival gangs competed to sell the drug. In legal markets, governments protect and enforce 
property rights; however, governments do not protect property rights in illegal markets, so 
participants must take it upon themselves to do so. As a result, in the absence of property rights, 
most disputes are resolved with threats or acts of violence, as there are no other means available. 
As Resignato (2000) puts it: 
 “Drug market participants tend to arm themselves as protection from robbery or attack.  … 
Drug market participants know that violent acts are less likely to be reported, lowering the 
expected legal repercussions, thus lowering the expected loss of perpetuating violence.   All 
these factors lead to an environment characterized by violence or the continuing threat of 
violence. Victims of this violence are usually drug users or dealers, but many times violent 
spillovers claim non-participating victims such as law enforcement officers and bystanders”. 
 
3.   ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Unit Root Tests Without Structural Breaks 
We start through testing for the presence of a unit root in crime rates using the ADF unit root test. 
To select the lag length (k), we use the ‘t-sig’ approach proposed by Hall (1994). We set the 
maximum lag length equal to eight (k =8) and use the approximate 10 per cent asymptotic 
critical value of 1.60 to determine the significance of the t-statistic on the last lag. We do not 
max
increase the upper bound when   is selected. To ensure the robustness of the ADF test  max k k =
results, we also apply the Phillips-Perron and DF-GLS test for unit roots. While the ADF test 
corrects for higher order serial correlation by adding lagged difference terms to the right-hand side, 
the Phillips Perron test makes a non-parametric correction to account for residual serial correlation. 
Monte Carlo studies suggest that the Phillips-Perron test generally has greater power than the ADF 
test (see e.g. Banerjee et al., 1993). Elliot et al. (1996) show that the DF-GLS test has substantially 
improved power over the ADF test when an unknown trend is present. 
 
LM Unit Root Test with One and Two Structural Break(s) 
To examine the effect of structural break(s) on the null hypothesis of a unit root in crime rates, we 
employ the univariate LM test, which entails estimating the following equation: 
it t i i it i t P X CRIME ο δ κ + + Δ = Δ −1 ,
' ~
       ( ) 1    8
Here, CRIMEt is the crime rate at time t,  Δ is the first difference operator and following Schmidt 
and Phillips (1992)  1 − t , i P ~
 is the detrended value of CRIMEt-1. The term  it ο is a stochastic 
disturbance term. If the specified crime rate has a unit root then  0 = i δ , which is the null 
hypothesis tested against the alternative hypothesis that  0 < i δ . To select the lag length we use 
Hall’s (1994) ‘t sig’ approach as described above.  
 
Lee and Strazicich (2003a, b) expand Equation (1) to allow for one structural break in the intercept 
and one structural break in the slope. Lee and Strazicich (2003a, b) also propose a model that 
accounts for two structural breaks in the intercept and slope. A structural break in the model is 
incorporated by specifying , which is a vector of exogenous variables defined by the data 
generating process as [ , where   is a dummy variable that denotes the time when a 
structural break occurs. If a break for a specified crime i occurs at  , then the dummy variable 
 if  , zero otherwise, and 
it X
] ' D , t , it 1 it D
i TB
1 = it D i TB t > TB t DTt − =  if  , zero otherwise. In a similar vein, 
two structural breaks can be incorporated into the series by specifying   as  , 
where   and   are dummy variables that capture the first structural break and the second 
structural break, respectively. Here, 
i TB t >
it X [] ' D , D , t , it it 2 1 1
it D1 it D2
1 1 = t DU  if  , zero otherwise;   if  , 
zero otherwise, and   if  , zero otherwise; and   if  , 
zero otherwise.  To determine the break point endogenously in each time series, Lee and 
Strazicich (2003a, b) suggest the “minimum LM” test. The “minimum LM” test involves using a grid 
search to determine the break at the location where the t-test statistic is minimized: 
1 TB t > 1 2 = t DU 2 TB t >




~ LM Inf λ τ
λ
τ = , which is carried out at each combination of break points  T TB = λ  over the 
trimming region (0.15T, 0.85T), where T denotes sample size. Critical values for the one break 
case are tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003b), while critical values for the two break case are 
tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003a). 
 
Panel LM Unit Root Test 
Consider the following model which tests for stationarity of a specific type of crime: 
it it i it X CRIME μ κ + =
' ,   it t , i i it ε μ λ μ + = −1        () 2
Here,   represents the cross-section of countries i ( ) N ,..., i 1 = ,  t represents the time 
period( ,  ) T ,..., t 1 = it μ is the error term and   is a vector of exogenous variables. The test for the 
unit root null hypothesis is based on the parameter
it X
i λ , while  it ε  is a zero mean error term which   9
allows for heterogeneous variance structure across cross-sectional units, but assumes no cross 
correlations. The parameter  i λ  allows for heterogeneous measures of persistence. Structural 
breaks are incorporated into the model using the same criteria as in the univariate case. The panel 
LM test statistic is obtained by averaging the optimal univariate LM unit root t-test statistics for 
each country. This is denoted as : 
τ
i LM













Im et al. (2005) then construct a standardized panel LM unit root test statistic by letting  ( ) T L E  and 
 denote the expected value and variance of , respectively under the null hypothesis. 
They then compute the following test statistic: 







L E LM N −
= ψ            () 4
Im et al. (2005) provide the numerical values for  ( ) T L E  and  ( ) T L V . The asymptotic distribution is 
unaffected by the presence of structural breaks and is standard normal.  
 
4.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data 
Annual time series data for aggregate total crime per 100,000 people as well as crime rates per 
100,000 people for specific types of crime for the United States for the period 1960 to 2002 are 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Index of Crime.
i  The specific 
types of crimes which we examine for the United States are assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, 
murder, rape, robbery and theft as well as the generic categories, property and violent crimes. 
Annual time series data for aggregate total crime rates per 100,000 people as well as crime rates 
per 100,000 people for specific types of crime for the United Kingdom for the period 1898 to 1999 
are from the British Home Office.
ii The specific types of crime which we examine for the United 
Kingdom are burglary, criminal damage, fraud, robbery, sexual, theft and violent crime. Note that 
the British Home Office changed the manner in which it defined various crimes after 1999, 
meaning that the United Kingdom crime data is not comparable before and after 1999. The data on 
aggregate total crime rates per 100,000 people for each of the G7 countries for the period 1980 to 
2002 are from the United Nations crime statistics.
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Results for the United States 
We begin through applying the ADF, Phillips-Perron and DF-GLS unit root tests to the aggregate 
crime rate as well as the nine specific types of crime for the United States for the period 1960-2002 
in levels. The results are reported in Table 1. According to the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root 
tests, the null of a unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance for 
the levels of the crimes rates. However, when we subject the crime rates to the unit root tests on 
the first difference of the data, we are able to reject the unit root null hypothesis at the 10 per cent 
level or better. Thus, the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests suggest crime rates in the United 
States are integrated of order one. However, for assault the result from the DF-GLS test differs 
from the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, in that we are unable to reject the null of a unit root on the 
first difference of the assault series, implying that assault is in fact integrated of order two. 
 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
----------------------- 
Failure to reject the unit root hypothesis using the ADF, Phillips-Perron and DF-GLS unit root tests 
may reflect the fact that these tests do not take into account potential structural breaks in the crime 
series. Thus, in Table 2, we report the results from the LM one break unit root test for the United 
States. In contrast to the results in Table 1, we are able to reject the unit root null hypothesis for 
three specific types of crime; namely, assault, violent crime and motor vehicle theft at the 5 per 
cent level of statistical significance. This finding is consistent with there being a natural rate for 
these three specific crimes, but crime hysteresis for aggregate total crime as well as the six other 
specific crimes. 
 
For the crime categories other than rape, robbery and violent crime the coefficient on the intercept 
and/or slope for the structural break is statistically significant. The structural break occurs either in 
the mid-1970s for murder or the 1980s. The structural break for burglaries, homicides, theft and 
property crime more generally occur within a few years of the peak in each of these crime series in 
the United States. The homicide rate peaked at 10.2 per 100,000 in 1980; the burglary rate peaked 
at 1684 per 100,000 in 1980; the theft rate peaked at 3229 per 100,000 in 1991; and property 
crime peaked at 5140 per 100,000 in 1991. The structural break for assault and motor vehicle theft 
occurred in the early to mid 1980s, while these crimes peaked in the early 1990s. Since the early 
1990s there has been a decline in crime in the United States across the board.  Reasons offered 
for this decline include increases in the number of police, rising prison population, waning crack 
epidemic and legalization of abortion (Imrohoroglu et al., 2004; Levitt, 2004).  
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-------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
-------------------- 
It is possible that we would find evidence of a natural rate for the other series if we allowed for two 
structural breaks, but we do not attempt this for the United States because of the relatively short 
time span. Instead, we apply the LM unit root test with two structural breaks to the United Kingdom 
data, for which there is a longer time series. 
Results for the United Kingdom 
In Table 3, we report the results from the ADF, PP and DF-GLS tests for the United Kingdom for 
the aggregate total crime rate and the seven specific crime series. The ADF and Phillips-Perron 
unit root tests suggest that all series are integrated of order one. However, using the DF-GLS unit 
root test we are unable to reject the unit root null hypothesis for burglary, theft, violent crime and 
aggregate total crime, even when taking the first difference of these crime series This implies that 
based on the ADF, Phillips-Perron and DF-GLS unit root tests, none of the crime rate series in the 
United Kingdom are stationary and that they are either integrated of order one or order two  
-------------------- 
Insert Table 3 
-------------------- 
In Table 4 we present the results for the LM unit root test with one structural break for the United 
Kingdom. We are able to reject the unit root null hypothesis for criminal damage and violent crime 
at the 5 per cent level or better.  For those crime series for which there is a statistically significant 
structural break in the intercept and/or slope, the structural break either occurs in the late 1950s 
(violent crime), early to mid-1970s (criminal damage, theft and aggregate total crime), or late 1980s 
(burglary). The 1970s and 1980s was a period of rapid rise in crime in the United Kingdom and the 
structural break in the criminal damage and aggregate total crime series occurs around the 
beginning of sustained upswing in crime rate. The structural break in burglary rates in 1988 
corresponds to the peak in this series in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The burglary rate in the 
United Kingdom has fallen since the early 1990s, which can possibly be explained by the 
increased prevalence of neighborhood watch schemes which were introduced in the early 1980s 
and have became widespread since the 1990s.  
 
Failure to reject the unit root null hypothesis for the remainder of the crime rate series may be due 
to the presence of two structural breaks. We investigate this possibility by applying the LM two 
structural break unit root test. The results are reported in Table 5. We are able to reject the unit 
root null hypothesis for the total crime rate at the 1 per cent level as well as five of the seven 
specific crime series; namely, violent crime, robbery, burglary, theft and criminal damage, each at 
the 1 per cent level.  The only crimes for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root   12
for the United Kingdom are fraud and sexual offences. For each crime series the second structural 
break has a statistically significant intercept and/or slope. For burglary and violent crime the 
location of the structural break in the one break case is close to the location of one of the breaks in 
the two break case, but this is not the case for the other crime series. For each of the crime series 
the second structural break occurs in the 1970s or 1980s, with five series including aggregate total 
crime in the second half of the 1980s during the period of rapid increase in crime in the United 
Kingdom under the Thatcher Conservative government. 
-------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 & 5 
-------------------- 
 
Results for the G7 Panel 
In Table 6 we report the ADF, Phillips-Perron and the DF-GLS unit root test results for the total 
crime rate for the G7 countries over the period 1980-2002 for six of the seven G7 and 1980 to 
1999 for the United Kingdom. The ADF, Phillips-Perron and DF-GLS unit root tests reject the unit 
root null hypothesis for the total crime rate in France, but suggest that the total crime rate in the 
other G7 countries is either integrated of order one or two. However, as is well-known, the ADF 
and Phillips-Perron tests have low power against stationary alternatives in small samples (see e.g. 
Cochrane, 1991; De-Jong et al., 1992). Thus, in order to exploit the extra power in the panel 
properties of the data we applied the LM panel unit root test results with and without a structural 
break to the entire panel as well as smaller panels over the period 1980 to 1999 and 1980 to 2002. 
-------------------- 
Insert Table 6 
-------------------- 
We constructed four different panels. The first panel consists of all the G7 countries. Leon-
Ledesma (2002), however, suggests that because the advantage of panel data unit root tests is 
that they provide higher power relative to univariate unit root tests, it is more meaningful to apply 
panel data tests to those series for which we cannot reject the null. Thus, the second panel is a 
‘unit root six’ consisting of the G7 countries, excluding France. The third panel consists of the G7 
countries with a civil law system (France, Germany, Italy and Japan), while the fourth panel 
consists of the G7 countries which have a common law system (Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the United States).  
 
The reason for constructing different panels for common law and civil law countries is that the 
institutional arrangements in the two systems differ and this potentially has implications for optimal 
law enforcement. Civil law countries have codified law, limited jurisprudence and centralized   13
judicial systems relative to common law countries whose legal systems are characterized by a 
collection of disparate doctrines largely judge-made in a decentralized fashion. These different 
institutional arrangements mean that in civil law countries there is less complexity and less 
uncertainty of information relative to common law countries (Garoupa, 2005). However, as 
Garoupa (2005) notes, the effect of different levels of certainty, complexity and information on law 
enforcement is unclear.  Complexity and uncertainty could increase deterrence, allowing 
governments to save on enforcement costs if, for instance, criminals were averse to uncertainty. 
On the other hand, if the social costs of mistakes in estimating legal policy instruments increases 
more with the sanction than the probability of detection, uncertainty might lead the government to 
reduce the sanction and increase the likelihood of detection leading to higher enforcement costs. 
There is some empirical evidence that deterrence to commit harmful acts differ between civil law 
and common law countries. Smith (2003) examines differences in various types of fatalities 
including motor vehicle deaths between civil law and common law countries and finds lower fatality 
rates in common law countries. 
-------------------- 
Insert Table 7 
-------------------- 
The results of the LM panel data tests are reported in Table 7. For all four panels, with the panel 
LM test without a structural break, the test statistics are all greater than the critical values at the 
conventional levels of significance, implying that we cannot reject the joint unit root null hypothesis. 
However, when we include a structural break in the LM unit root test for the four panels, we are 
able to reject the joint unit root null hypothesis, as each test statistic is smaller than the critical 
value at the 1 per cent level. 
 
5.   DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Overall, the results provide strong support for the hypothesis that there is a natural rate of crime. At 
first blush, we appear to find less support for the natural rate of crime hypothesis in the United 
States than the United Kingdom. However, this conclusion is misleading. Comparing the results 
from the LM unit root one break test, we actually find more support for the natural rate hypothesis 
in the United States than the United Kingdom. In the one break case there is support for the natural 
rate hypothesis in the United States for three crime series (assault, motor vehicle theft and violent 
crime) relative to two crime series in the United Kingdom (criminal damage and violent crime).  It is 
only when we allow for two structural breaks in the LM unit root test for the United Kingdom, that 
we are able to reject the unit root null hypothesis for each crime series except fraud and sexual 
offences. This result suggests that the failure to reject the unit root null for the United States for 
more crime series is likely to reflect the fact that we only allow for one structural break in the LM   14
unit root test in the United States case because of the shorter time series span. If we had a longer 
time series which permitted us to allow for two structural breaks, we would most likely find more 
support for the natural rate of crime hypothesis for the United States.  The importance of allowing 
for structural breaks is also highlighted by the G7 panel data tests. With the LM panel data test 
without a structural break we were unable to reject the natural rate hypothesis for any of the 
panels, but allowing for a structural break we find support for the natural rate of crime hypothesis 
for the full panel as well as the smaller common law and civil law panels. 
 
As discussed above, Buck et al. (1983, 1985) stated the natural rate of crime hypothesis in terms 
of blue collar property crime for which they argued that there is a pool of potential offenders who 
experience long run diminishing marginal returns to legitimate earning opportunities. In the one 
break LM unit root case the only property crime for which there is a natural rate in the United 
States is motor vehicle theft, while criminal damage has a natural rate in the United Kingdom. The 
results for criminal damage are surprising in the sense that while criminal damage is a form of 
property crime, it is unlikely to be profit motivated as burglary, robbery or theft.  The results for 
criminal damage, however, are consistent with the sociological argument in Buck et al. (1985, pp. 
257-258) that economic and social tensions within local communities produce a pool of individuals 
who “possess or who have developed demoralization costs towards society” which make them 
detached from society and whose frustration is exhibited in destructive behavior. 
 
The series which has a natural rate in the LM one break case in both the United States and United 
Kingdom is violent crime. While we do not test for drug crime because of lack of data, to the extent 
that drug crime and violent crime are correlated, the results for violent crime are consistent with the 
argument that the high pecuniary returns to drug crime mean that drug crime will be unaffected in 
the long-run by conventional police expenditures. In the two break case for the United Kingdom the 
results for burglary, robbery and theft are consistent with Buck et al.’s (1983, 1985) basic thesis 
about blue collar property crime.  In the two break case for the United Kingdom we are unable to 
reject the unit root null hypothesis for fraud or sexual offences. This result is expected because 
while fraud is a property crime, it is a white collar crime committed by those who have high returns 
to legitimate earning opportunities, rather than those in Buck et al.’s (1983, 1985) pool of hard-
core criminals who have few prospects and whose marginal benefits of an additional unit of time in 
legal activity are diminishing. Similarly, sexual offences are not profit motivated and, in contrast to 
other forms of violent crime are unlikely to be committed in the act of carrying out blue collar 
property crime. 
 
The implications for the deterrence hypothesis from our results, at least for the United Kingdom 
and G7 panel is that for aggregate total crime and most specific types of crime increased   15
expenditure on law enforcement will have no effect on the long-run equilibrium level of crime. This 
provides an economic explanation for those studies employing an Ehrlich (1973) ‘supply of 
offences’ function which have failed to find evidence of a deterrence effect. Neoclassical 
economics suggests that fiscal and monetary policies cannot lower the long-run unemployment 
level below its natural rate and instead it is necessary to address the root cause of unemployment 
in the form of policies such as better information on labor market demands, vocational training and 
anti-discrimination measures. In a similar vein, the policy implications of the findings in this study 
lend support to the argument often made by criminologists that governments should reconsider 
allocating resources from crime prevention to crime corrective measures which address the causes 
of criminal motivation rather than the symptoms. This approach involves addressing, in the 
language of Buck et al. (1983, p. 480) “the social and economic structural profiles  ….  [which] 
dictate the [natural rate of crime]”. This entails adopting a suite of policies including education and 
income policies for disadvantaged families as well as policies designed to rehabilitate ex-offenders 
(see Friedman et al., 1989, p. 190). 
 
6.   CONCLUSION 
Studies which have utilized an Ehrlich (1973) supply of offences function have reached mixed 
conclusions on the deterrence hypothesis. This outcome has led some researchers to offer 
reasons why, within an economic framework, increased expenditure on crime need not lead to a 
reduction in crime rates. One such explanation is the concept of a natural rate of crime which 
suggests that there is no deterrent effect in the long run. This paper has applied the unit root 
testing methodology which has been widely employed in the labor market literature to examine 
whether there is a natural rate of unemployment to investigate whether there is a natural rate of 
crime. To do this we utilize the LM unit root test with structural breaks, which has the advantage 
that it is unaffected by breaks under the null. Our main finding from the LM unit root test with two 
breaks applied to the United Kingdom data and panel LM unit root test with one break applied to 
various panels of G7 countries is that there is a natural rate of crime.  The policy implications of our 
results is that instead of spending more on law enforcement which will have no effect on the long-
run crime rate, governments should consider policies which affect the economic and social 
structural factors which determine the crime rate in the long run. 
 
We have allowed for at most two structural breaks. Given our finding that most crime series are 
breakpoint stationary, one avenue for future research would be to test for the presence of multiple 
structural breaks using the method proposed by Bai and Perron (1998).  The Bai and Perron 
(1998) method can be applied to test for, and estimate, multiple structural changes in non-trending 
data once regime-wise stationarity has been established. The Bai and Perron (1998) method   16
requires a long time series, but it could be applied for instance to the crime data for the United 
Kingdom. One could extend on the results from the Bai and Perron (1998) method, using the 
approach pioneered by Caporale and Grier (2000) to examine political influences on interest rates, 
to investigate the effects of changes in government policies on movements in the crime rate. For 
instance, one could examine the effects of gender differences on the natural rate of crime, based 
on changes in equal opportunity policies with successive governments.   17
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Table 1: ADF, Phillips-Perron and ADF-GLS tests for the United States 1960-2002 
 
  ADF Test  PP Test  DF(GLS) Test 
 Levels  First  Differences    Levels  First 
Differences 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 
Assault  -1.458 (2)  -3.703 (0)**  I(1)  0.392 (3)  -3.557(1)** I(1)  -2.216(2) -2.202(1)  I(2) 
Murder  -1.706 (1)  -3.750 (0)**  I(1)  -0.777 (2)  -3.607(4)** I(1)  -1.737(1) -3.483(0)** I(1) 
Burglary  -0.994 (2)  -6.016 (1) *  I(1)  -0.763 (10)  -4.200 (4)*  I(1)  -1.835(5)  -5.570 (1)*  I(1) 
MVT  -2.220 (1)  -3.227 (0) ***  I(1)  -1.065 (3)  -3.205(4)*** I(1)  -2.184(1)  -3.153  (0)***  I(1) 
Property  0.135 (2)  -6.996 (1)*  I(1)  0.630 (0)  -4.047(19)**  I(1)  -0.823 (3)  -6.318 (1)*  I(1) 
Rape  -0.959 (1)  -4.630 (2)*  I(1)  0.199 (4)  -3.316(18)***  I(1)  -1.415 (1)  -3.556 (0)**  I(1) 
Robbery  -0.566 (2)  -4.833 (1)*  I(1)  -0.538 (3)  -3.640(19)**  I(1)  -1.660 (1)  -4.551 (1)*  I(1) 
Theft  0.536 (2)  -6.828 (1)*  I(1)  -2.053 (4)  -4.468(17)*  I(1)  -0.323 (2)  -6.333 (1)*  I(1) 
Violent  -0.796 (1)  -3.625 (0) **  I(1)  0.417 (1)  -3.252(9)***  I(1)  -1.409 (1)  -3.442 (0)**  I(1) 
Total  0.334 (2)  -6.790 (1)*  I(1)  0.735 (18)  -4.067(20)**  I(1)  -0.874 (3)  -6.097(1)*  I(1) 
 
Note: All calculations use trend & intercept. MVT is ‘motor vehicle theft’. Figure in parenthesis is lag length/bandwidth. Bandwidth for Phillips-
Perron test is based on Newey West using Bartlett Kernel. Critical values for the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests are compiled from 
MacKinnon (1991). Critical values for the DF(GLS) test are from Elliot et. al. (1996). *=1%; **=5%; ***=10%.    22
Table 2: Lee and Strazicich (2003a) one break test for the United States 1960-2002 
 
 Violent  Property  Murder Rape  Robbery 
TB   1983  1988 1976  1983 1983 








































k   5 5  5  5  5 
 Assault  Burglary  Theft  MVT  Total 
TB   1985  1981 1988  1982 1982 








































k   5 1  5  4  5 
 
Notes:  j λ denotes the location of breaks.  * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. TB is the break date, α is the coefficient on the unit root parameter, 
 is the coefficient on the time trend,  T ( ) t B  is the coefficient on the break in the intercept,  ( ) t D  
is the coefficient on the break in the slope, and   is the optimal lag length. Critical values for the 
LM one break unit root test statistic are tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003b) 
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Table 3: ADF, Phillips-Perron and ADF-GLS tests for the United Kingdom, 1898-1999 
 
  ADF Test  PP Test  DF(GLS) Test 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 
Burglary  -2.196 (7)  -3.149 (8)***  I(1)  -1.454 (8)  -6.023 (4)*  I(1)  -1.624 (1)  -1.486 (8)  I(2) 
Crim. dam.  0.355 (0)  -7.912 (0)*  I(1)  -0.002 (4)  -7.826(2)*  I(1)  -0.812 (2)  -7.641 (0)*  I(1) 
Fraud  -0.071 (1)  -7.019 (0)*  I(1)  -1.862 (4)  -7.005 (2)*  I(1)  -1.519 (1)  -7.091 (0)*  I(1) 
Robbery  9.808 (8)  -0.0709 (8)  I(2)  0.7843 (1)  -7.677 (1)*  I(1)  -1.016 (3)  -3.705 (2)*  I(1) 
Sexual  -1.613 (0)  -8.837 (0)*  I(1)  -1.940 (6)  -8.827 (1)*  I(1)  -0.838 (0)  -8.905 (0)*  I(1) 
Theft  0.212 (6)  -2.685 (8)  I(2)  -1.629 (3)  -5.411(9)*  I(1)  -0.963 (2)  -1.615 (8)  I(2) 
Violent  1.409 (7)  -1.929 (6)  I(2)  4.660 (5)  -10.086(6)*  I(1)  -1.862 (6)  -1.461 (6)  I(2) 
Total  -1.518 (1)  -2.326 (8)  I(2)  -1.195(3)  -5.852(5)*  I(1)  -1.120 (1)  -1.143 (8)  I(2) 
 
Note: All calculations use trend & intercept. Crim. dam. Is ‘criminal damage’. Figure in parenthesis is lag length/bandwidth. Bandwidth for Phillips-
Perron test is based on Newey West using Bartlett Kernel. Critical values for the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests are compiled from 
MacKinnon (1991). Critical values for the DF(GLS) test are from Elliot et. al. (1996).  *=1%; **=5%; ***=10%   24
 
Table 4: Lee and Strazicich (2003a) one break test for the United Kingdom, 1898-
1999 
 Violent 
Sexual   Robbery  Burglary  Theft  Fraud 
criminal 
damage  Total 
TB   1958 1921 1965  1988  1972  1946 1975  1972 





































































k   8 5 8  8  6  6 8  8 
Critical values for the LM test 
λ   1 per cent  5 per cent  10 per cent 
0.1 -5.11  -4.50  -4.21 
0.2 -5.07  -4.47  -4.20 
0.3 -5.15  -4.45  -4.18 
0.4 -5.05  -4.50  -4.18 
0.5 -5.11  -4.51  -4.17 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 2   25
Table 5: Lee and Strazicich (2003b) two break test for the UK 
 
 Violent 
Sexual Robbery  Burglary  Theft  Fraud 
Criminal 
damage  Total       
1 TB   1956 1940 1958  1958  1959  1953  1969  1960 
2 TB   1986 1974 1979  1988  1987  1974  1988  1988 
































































































k   8 5 7  5  5  8  5  5 
Critical values for the LM test 
2 λ  
1 λ   0.4 0.6  0.8 
 1%  5%  10%  1%  5%  10%  1%  5%  10% 
0.2 -6.16  -5.59  -5.27  -6.41  -5.74 -5.32 -6.33 -5.71  -5.33 
0.4 -  -  -  -6.45  -5.67  -5.31 -6.42  -5.65  -5.32 
0.6 -  -  -  -  -  -  -6.32  -5.73  -5.32 
Notes:  j λ denotes the location of breaks. * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively.   and  are the first and second breaks, respectively,   1 TB 2 TB α is 
the coefficient on the unit root parameter, T  is the coefficient on the time trend,  and  () t B1 ( ) t B2  
are the coefficients on the first break and second break, respectively, in the intercept,   and 
 are the coefficients on the first break and second break, respectively, in the slope, and   
is the optimal lag length. 
() t D1
() t D2 k  26
Table 6: ADF, Phillips-Perron and ADF-GLS tests for G7 Total Crime 1980-2002 
 
  ADF Test  PP Test  DF(GLS) Test 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 Levels  First 
Differences 
 
Canada  -1.026 (0)  -2.038 (8)  I(2)  -1.237 (2)  -2.967 (0)  I(2)  -1.237 (2)  -2.967 (0)  I(2) 
France  -3.555  (0)***   I(0)  -3.548  (1)***   I(0)  -3.549(1)***   I(0) 
Germany  -1.785 (1)  0.706 (8)  I(2)  -1.557 (0)  -3.929 (3)**  I(1)  -1.557 (0)  -3.929 (3)**  I(1) 
Italy  -1.764 (0)  -6.993 (8)*  I(1)  -1.764 (0)  -3.720 (2)**  I(1)  -1.764 (0)  -3.720 (2)**  I(1) 
Japan -2.167  (7)  -3.577(7)***  I(1)  0.406  (2) -3.247 (1)***  I(1)  0.406 (2)  -3.247 (1)***  I(1) 
USA  -1.043 (8)  -4.303 (8)**  I(1)  -1.400 (1)  -3.721 (0)**  I(1)  -1.400 (1)  -3.721(0)**  I(1) 
UK  -1.875 (1)  -2.686 (1)  I(2)  -0.835 (1)  -2.416 (1)  I(2)  -0.835 (1)  -2.416 (1)  I(2) 
 
Note: All calculations use trend & intercept. Figure in parenthesis is lag length/bandwidth. Bandwidth for Phillips-Perron test is based on Newey 
West using Bartlett Kernel. Critical values for the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests are compiled from MacKinnon (1991). Critical values for 
the DF(GLS) test are from Elliot et. al. (1996).  *=1%; **=5%; ***=10%.UK figures are for 1980-1999 and for UK kmax=4.   27
 
Table 7: LM Panel unit root test results 
 
Panels  LM test with no break  LM test with one break 
G7   -0.720  -4.724* 
G6 (G7 minus France)  -0.591  -4.183* 
G4 (Civil Law Panel – France, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan) 
0.055 -2.817* 




Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for the panel LM 
test with and without a structural break are –2.326, -1.645 and –1.282, respectively.  





                                                  
i Source: http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/02cius.htm; http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/xl/02tbl01.xls 
ii Source: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/100years.xls
iii Major Source: www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/ sixthsurvey/TotalRecordedCrime.pdf  
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